China and the Multilateral Trading System
For more than two decades, China's rapid growth has been driven by its global economic engagement. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, foreign trade and foreign direct investment have made even more important contributions to Chinese growth. Given its size, the pace of its expansion, and its outward orientation, China is likely to have a growing impact on the global trading system and its policies are likely to have an important influence on the system's evolution. These policies have been as dynamic as its trade and investment performance. In 2001 after fourteen years of negotiations, China became a full member of the WTO, assuming obligations that are at 1 In 2003 and 2004 china accounted for 10.6 and 8.9 of the growth in world imports and 10.5 and 9.7 of world exports. 2 Having assumed the ranks of the world's third largest trader, Chinese trade policies will now be subject to the WTO Trade review mechanism every two years -a treatment reserved for countries with large trade volumes.
the level of many developed economies. Since that time it has participated actively in the institution's activities and negotiations. In part to meet the conditions of its accession, China has also dramatically liberalized its domestic economy and introduced a large number of internal policies that consolidate its transition to a market economy. In addition, China has adopted a multi-track trade policy strategy, complementing its WTO and domestic liberalization policies with regional trading initiatives. What do these policies portend? When China proposed joining the WTO several concerns were raised. One was that the system as a whole could be weakened because China was not a fully market driven economy and was therefore unlikely or unable to adhere to the WTO rules. China then acceded to the WTO under very demanding terms and there were fears that either deliberately or inadvertently it would not implement these commitments. 4 This would put other members in the difficult position of either (a) trying to compel compliance with trade retaliation and other sanctions that could increase frictions or (b) ignoring Chinese infractions thereby undermining the WTO system in establishing an international rule of law to which all members adhered.
A second concern was that China would not participate constructively in the WTO. It would throw its weight around, try quickly to obtain disproportionate influence and use its influence to fundamentally change the WTO system. China was also seen as a potentially powerful addition to the ranks of developing countries, and many in the developed world worried that it would seek to limit the obligations required of developing countries.
More recently a third set of questions is being raised with respect to China's trade policies in the East Asian region. Would Chinese regional initiatives undermine the multilateral trading order? Is China seeking to establish an East Asian trading bloc under its leadership that discriminates against outsiders? Will it use its market to create a hub and spoke system in East Asia in which China gains serves as the hub and the other countries are the spokes? Finally there is the fear that not only China but other countries in the region are creating a system of overlapping trade regimes -or a noodle bowl -that could impose unnecessary trading costs, induce harmful trade diversion, and actually fragment rather than integrate the regional economy.
This paper, considers these questions. Chinese policies are analyzed with a view to determining the direction they are taking and the effects they are likely to have on the multilateral system. The discussion first considers China's participation in the WTO. It reviews the terms of accession, China's current tariff and trade regime and its participation in the Doha Round negotiations and the institution's regular activities. The analysis concludes that China's trade policies are broadly supportive of a rules based multilateral trading order. China has accepted and implemented obligations that go far further than most developing countries. It has been interested in using the system to advance its interests rather than in changing it. 5 Its behavior at the WTO is thus more akin to that of a status quo power than one seeking major systemic changes. The discussion then turns to China's FTA initiatives. These are still a work in progress, and their implications are uncertain. Concerns about an East Asian fortress appear misplaced.
Directly, and through their impact in inducing others to respond, these FTAs could provide a powerful impetus to the process of competitive global liberalization. Countries that do implement agreements with China will find it relatively easy to open their markets to other developing countries. There is also a risk that the proliferation of FTAs will lead to web of overlapping agreements that could make the trading system unnecessarily complex.
China's policies both at home and abroad are still evolving and thus major shifts in the direction and nature of the policies cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, the final section considers four factors that could play an important role in influencing outcomes in the future. These are the precise terms of the agreements that are concluded, China's domestic implementation of its commitments, the impact of currency appreciation on China's competitiveness and protectionist responses to China by other countries.
Section I: China in the WTO
The WTO operates by consensus. Any country seeking to join must essentially satisfy all existing members before they will permit it to accede. To be sure, forming new alliances and mergers with both domestic and foreign firms.
The WTO accession process also served to promote better Chinese governance.
The WTO requires policy transparency and the enforcement of domestic trade policies on the basis of rules rather than bureaucratic discretion. WTO membership also necessitates non-discrimination (i.e. national treatment) for imported goods and services. China remains a country with considerable domestic barriers and strong provincial governments. If provinces are forced to provide national treatment for imported goods and services, they will find it harder to discriminate against goods from other provinces.
Many of these reforms are changes that China might have chosen to implement anyway, but entry into the WTO served to advance their implementation.
In 2004, as reported in Table 1 China has also been visibly unenthusiastic about the annual Transitional Review
Mechanism it is forced to undergo. China is required by the terms of accession agreement each year to provide an extensive amount of data regarding its policies and performance and then to submit to questioning by other members. These reviews are a nagging reminder about the terms of its accession that some in China viewed as having been a sell out. They also appear to question China's integrity and its willingness to honor its legally binding commitments. China grudgingly sticks to the letter of law in meeting this commitment, giving only oral answers to questions that are often less than forthcoming.
It is clearly an unwilling participant and does not take kindly to the treatement.
All told therefore, China is seeking normalcy not special treatment and this is something it will gain once the transitory arrangements associated with its accession expire. Within a decade, special safeguards, non-market status, and transitional review mechanisms will expire and China will gladly assume its role as a more normal but very important WTO member.
What accounts for the way in which China has participated in the WTO? Why has it chosen to be constructive and yet not highly assertive? China is constructive because the WTO is a very attractive institution for China that clearly serves its interests. To be sure, China was important enough to receive MFN treatment from almost all countries even prior to joining, and some suggested that by joining under such demanding terms, it was opening itself up to challenges that could have actually reduced its market access.
14 But, for the most part such challenges have been conspicuous by their absence, and
China now enjoys unconditional MFN treatment and the ability to enforce its rights through the dispute settlement system.
China's political relations with other countries are often problematic because of the undemocratic nature of its system of government and its poor record on human rights.
This gives China a great interest in a strong, rules-based WTO because it allows its trade and investment issues to be placed a less political, more technical track. In addition, since China does not have FTAs or benefit from preferences in its major developed country markets --the US, EU and Japan (so far) --the MFN terms on which access to these markets is granted is especially important for China.
14 See Mallon and Whalley op. cit.
Bargaining at the WTO is done on the basis of reciprocal concessions. This means that those with the largest markets exercise the greatest power. China's large and growing market and its willingness and ability to liberalize position it naturally to exercise influence. But so far, it has been prudent it the way it has exercised this power. This is because China also seeks to be a leader of the developing countries and its economic interest in liberalization and competitiveness in exporting come into conflict with the desire of many developing countries to seek special and differential treatment and benefit from preferential access. This leads it to be less outspoken about its interests than it might otherwise be and allows China to leave the demands for developing country liberalization to the developed countries.
Historically, times during which new powers are arising on the global stage have been filled with tension. And the real challenge for the rest of the world lies in ensuring that an emergent China has incentives to engage the rest of the world in a cooperative and peaceful fashion. China's performance at the WTO suggests that at least so far, by allowing China to join, the rest of the world has helped meet this challenge.
Section III: Regional Arrangements.
Like almost every other WTO member, China has not confined its trade policy to the WTO. 15 Instead, it has both embraced and stimulated the current global trend towards Free Trade Agreements. 16 China has concluded several agreements and is in the process of negotiating many more. In 2001, it began talks with ASEAN 15 Some countries, embarrassed by the need to explain why they are departing from a pure multilateral strategy use the excuse of slow movement in the Doha Round as the reason why they are suddenly launching into a large number of FTAs but this is not generally very persuasive since some of the countries making this excuse are among the least forthcoming. This is not, however, an argument made by the Chinese government. China has heralded this agreement. Its press observes "The China-ASEAN FTA will form a huge market, with 1.85 billion consumers and a combined gross domestic product of almost US$2.5 trillion. The value of imports and exports of this zone will hopefully exceed that of the NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) by 2010 and its GDP will likely be higher than that in the European Union market. These three, China-ASEAN free trade zone, NAFTA and the EU, will become the three pillars of the world economy." . 25 The Government also stresses "we will not be rushed. The Australian Government has stressed that any FTA with China must deliver real gains for Australian businesses across the board. That is, it must be comprehensive -covering goods, services and investment -and be completed as a single undertaking." Ibid. and 20 percent and average rate of protection of 5.6 percent.
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The fact that China is willing to conclude FTAs with these two developed countries that are highly competitive agricultural producers is very significant since it indicates a willingness to contemplate major adjustments in agriculture while also indicating these countries willingness to contemplate free trade in labor-intensive manufacturing.
Others. China has also launched talks with India and Pakistan. New Delhi does not quite share the enthusiasm for a conventional FTA although it is willing to talk about cooperation. But Pakistan and China have signed a framework agreement, implemented an early harvest and Pakistan has provided China with the requisite market economy status. China is also discussing FTAs with many other potential partners in Latin America (Brazil, Peru), South Africa, the Gulf (GCC), Iceland, Asia (Korea) and with regional groupings such as APEC and East Asia (Asean plus three),
Implications.
China has numerous goals in signing these agreements. One immediate concern is to use them to obtain market status recognition and relief from being subject to special safeguards. --Ironically China is using these discriminatory agreements as a way to remove the discrimination to which it has been subjected at the WTO. A second motive is to secure access to important raw materials-many of the countries 27 source: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/feasibility_3.pdf are major suppliers of minerals (Chile-copper, Australia --iron-ore and uranium, and GCC-oil). A third is to solidify its relations and influence both inside and beyond the East Asian region and a fourth, the most basic, is to gain improved market access for its exports which as labor -intensive manufactured and agricultural goods are often subject to high tariff protection. Individual agreements are also used to achieve specific goals. For example, the Hong Kong and Macao agreements help underscore the privileged relationship between the Mainland and these economies and ensure that despite their differences measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties could not be used to segment them. In addition these agreements were used to implement specific joint initiatives and signal clearly that Beijing would permit increased state owned banks to move some of their operations to Hong Kong.
China is well aware of concerns that it is trying to dominate East Asia and/or close it to outsiders, and it has gone to great pains to allay such fears. It is particularly reluctant to appear domineering in its interactions with Asean and it prefers that ASEAN take the leading role in the bilateral relationship. China also does not want to be seen as building a fortress Asia. Consider this official statement:
"We should continue to support ASEAN in playing the leading role in East Asia cooperation. On the other hand, we should give due consideration to the legitimate interests of the non-East Asian countries in this region, so as to gain their understanding of and support for East Asia cooperation." and Macao, although even these do not cover issues that are part and parcel of agreements that are typically signed by the US (e.g. intellectual property, labor and environment, government procurement, dispute settlement by panels) or the EU (e.g.
competition policy).
Stumbling blocs? These Chinese initiatives raise several concerns that are traditionally mentioned in debates about regional trade arrangements. The first is the concern that these regional arrangements are likely to undermine the multilateral trading system. This fear is misplaced. If (and this is an important qualification) they do achieve Instead, they are actively scouring the globe to find FTA partners. Singapore has FTAs with the US and a host of countries outside the region. 31 Likewise Thailand, Malaysia
The pact will cause disadvantages such as high tariffs for South Korean industries such as petrochemicals, textiles, shoes and electrical and electronic products, the KITA said. More than 21 per cent of South Korean exports to China will be subject to tariffs over 10 percentage points higher than those for China-bound ASEAN shipments in 2010, when the FTA is fully implemented, the KITA said. The FTA will impose no duties on more than 90 per cent of the trade between China and ASEAN members by that time. Hub and spoke? A third concern is that China is going to erect a hub and spoke system in which China has access to the regional economy duty free, but the other countries do not have similar access to one another. But in fact, almost all countries in the region are now negotiating with each other. For example, Asean is negotiating with both South Korea and Japan and Australia with many countries in the region. So this fear is also misplaced.
Noodle bowl? The one concern that is legitimate is the fact that these FTAs are of the GATT only states that the "duties and other regulations of commerce" once the FTA is concluded shall not be higher or more restrictive than they were before. But it does little to discipline the crafting of these to meet specific circumstances in a manner that is protectionist and inefficient. The simplest solution would be a single system of rules that would be applied by all WTO members in all preferential agreements.
Section III. Qualifications. Representative for example publishes an annual report on Chinese WTO compliance and it is filled with complaints of compliance failures. The most recent report for example is 34 The greater flexibility in these agreements may reflect domestic decision-making differences. In the case of the US, agreements must get through the congress.
101 pages long. 35 It is particularly concerned with the still incomplete transition from a state-planned economy. Other concerns include: the lack of enforcement of intellectual property laws, the continued use of industrial policies in sectors such as auto-parts, steel, and high-tech, regulatory intervention to support domestic enterprises, export restrictions on coke, the use of standards to favor domestic high tech producers and sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards to favor domestic farmers. Nonetheless, the USTR report does acknowledge that China has made great strides towards coming into compliance and it is surely the case that trade agreements make it more likely that these issues can be resolved.
Loss of competitiveness.
A third key qualification relates to the continuation of China's competitiveness and its impact on Chinese domestic politics. It seems clear that the competitiveness of its traded goods sector has clearly facilitated China's adjustment to its WTO accession and contributed significantly to the character of the trade policy that I have described in this paper. China is basically eager to erect a legal and political superstructure to ensure its access to key inputs and markets and it is prepared to expose its domestic firms and farmers to increased foreign competition in order to do so.
Nonetheless, even with the success it has enjoyed in recent years, domestic tensions have arisen with respect to the dislocation caused by the spread of the market economy.
There is a widespread view that the Chinese currency is seriously undervalued and there are strong external political pressures for a substantial appreciation. There is considerable debate over the appropriate course of action to deal with this issue, and a discussion here is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for out purposes it should be recognized that if a significant appreciation of the reminbi was to undermine Chinese competitiveness, the broad thrust of the policies described here could be adversely affected. Domestic protectionist pressures would surely increase and China would be considerably less eager to pursue reciprocal free trade agreements if it was less confident in its ability to compete. Whatever the costs of China's exchange rate policies might have been, therefore, the liberal nature of its recent trade policies should be counted among its benefits. when the Multi-fiber Agreement expired, led to the use of special safeguards in both economies. While these were legal, they are certainly discriminatory.
Hyper
In many developing countries, the highest non-agricultural tariffs are placed on precisely the labor-intensive products in which China specializes. So while China's trade policies are a force for a more liberal trading order, China's trade performance exerts Source: Nordstrom.
